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Contract farminga b s t r a c t
Due to its controversies, oil palm cultivation has been targeted by regulatory innovations. Among these,
transnational efforts—such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and corporate commit-
ments to zero deforestation have been highly influential but often tend to overvalue environmental over
socio-economic outcomes. This article discusses to what extent domestic governance models of palm oil
producing countries can be better equipped to reconcile domestic demands such as economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation, and transnational concerns about forest conservation. We do so by looking
into the Brazilian case, where the government intended to drive oil palm expansion in the Amazon
through a program launched in 2010 that simultaneously only allowed expansion into already deforested
areas and offered companies incentives to engage smallholder farmers in their supply chains. Our find-
ings, drawn from primary research activities and existing literature, indicate that Brazil has managed
to avoid deforestation typically associated with oil palm expansion elsewhere. Oil palm establishment
involved the conversion of 0.8% and 1.3% of primary forests for corporate and smallholder plantations,
respectively. However, the Brazilian government did not manage to optimally enhance smallholder par-
ticipation in the sector, as significant differences in performance were observed between farmers, ranging
from very successful (17%) to highly unsuccessful (12%); and failed to achieve sectoral development and
competitiveness targets. While some failings can be attributed to external factors such as context,
broader domestic governance frameworks and alignments, and private supply chain initiatives, the pro-
gram itself did not manage to reconcile social, environmental and economic objectives into a single
coherent sectoral governance model. Yet, this case study suggests that domestic governance strategies
can enable commodity production in a way that is more coherent with national priorities, at the same
time as preventing deforestation and minimizing social risks more effectively.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Few tropical commodities have been as controversial as palm
oil. The sector’s large social and environmental footprint has in
recent decades made it a primary target for civic action, driving
the emergence of several transnational regulatory innovations
(Noordwijk, Pacheco, Slingerland, Dewi, & Khasanah, 2017; Rival
& Levang, 2014). The voluntary certification scheme developedunder the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)—a multi-
stakeholder platform led by non-state actors—and corporate com-
mitments to zero deforestation are examples of highly influential
private regulations that aim to enhance the sector’s sustainability
in which public regulation plays virtually no role (Garrett, Levy,
Carlson, Gardner, Godar, Clapp, & Villoria, 2019; Nesadurai,
2018). Moreover, consumer country initiatives such as the Euro-
pean Union Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED) and public pro-
curement policies have emerged as influential demand-side
strategies, developed without significant producer government
involvement or endorsement (Jopke & Schoneveld, 2018;
Pacheco, Hospes, & Dermawan, 2017).
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pressure and the recognition that producer country governments
are insufficiently capacitated or incentivized to address many of
the socio-environmental impacts of commodity production
(Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). Such developments took place in a con-
text of globalization, privatization, and decentralization that chal-
lenged the traditional role of nation states. They also facilitated
deployment of alternative regulatory instruments to address inter-
national public good problems such as climate change (Lagendijk,
Arts, & Houtum, 2009; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006).
Many of these regulatory innovations, however, are predomi-
nantly designed to demonstrate that production does not adversely
affects the environment and, often secondarily, laborers and host
communities (Dauvergne, 2018; Pye, 2018). The challenge of lever-
aging the sector effectively in support of socio-economic develop-
ment thereby remains the duty of the nation state and beyond the
remit of transnational governance (Schouten & Hospes, 2018). As
such, many producer country governments are confronted by com-
plex trade-offs between agricultural development, conservation,
and poverty alleviation (Hidayat, Offermans, & Glasbergen, 2018;
Pramudya, Hospes, & Termeer, 2016). In particular, governments
and the development community alike are increasingly challenged
to develop innovative solutions to stimulate further agricultural
development that avoids conversion of high conservation value
ecosystems and improves the livelihoods of vulnerable groups.
All the while, they act to accommodating the needs and remaining
responsive to pressures from international actors (Astari & Lovett,
2019; Breslin & Nesadurai, 2018).
This raises urgent questions of both theoretical and practical
relevance. Is it at all possible to harmonize the interests of both
producer and consumer countries (including those of final con-
sumers), and of both corporations and smallholder farmers in the
global South? Should sector development remain dictated by
transnational governance or is there an emergent space for nation
states to retake authority and govern the sector more holistically
towards specific national development needs and interests?
In this article we aim to respond to these questions by critically
evaluating the unique case of Brazil. There, the federal government
sought to develop an alternative governance model for the sector
that explicitly seeks to reconcile conservation, sectoral develop-
ment, and poverty alleviation from the outset. Through the Sustain-
able Palm Oil Production Program (SPOPP), launched in 2010, the
government established a governance structure that aims to create
enabling conditions for expanding oil palm plantations and indus-
trial capacity in the Brazilian Amazon, while simultaneously: (a)
restricting expansion to degraded areas to prevent deforestation
and restore degraded lands, and (b) promoting social inclusion by
incentivizing companies to engage smallholder farmers in their
supply chains through contract farming (Brandão & Schoneveld,
2015). This article evaluates whether the federal government
through SPOPP has managed to accomplish these economic, envi-
ronmental, and social objectives, and effectively balance trade-
offs between these objectives. This allows us to provide new
insights into debates on transnational versus national governance
systems in high forest risk sectors and identify opportunities for
better aligning sector development with socio-environmental con-
cerns (Astari & Lovett, 2019; Ewert & Maggetti, 2016).
The article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, a back-
ground section briefly introduces the governance debates around
oil palm both globally and in Brazil. This is followed by a third sec-
tion that presents the analytical framework and the methodologi-
cal approach. The fourth section syntheses our findings on
environmental, social, and economic outcomes of oil palm expan-
sion under the auspices of SPOPP, followed by an analysis of out-
come attribution to specific governance arrangements. The paper
then reflects on trade-offs between different types of outcomes,2
before concluding with a reflection on the findings and implica-
tions for governance.
2. The governance of palm oil supply
2.1. Transnational versus domestic debates
The palm oil value chain is governed by a variety of different
domestic and transnational sustainability initiatives. The complex-
ity of sustainability initiatives is such that some authors refer to it
as the ‘palm oil governance complex’ (Pacheco, Schoneveld,
Dermawan, Komarudin, & Djama, 2018). The most important
transnational initiative is arguably the RSPO. Established in 2004
as a multi-stakeholder platform, RSPO involves non-state actors
in response to a pervasive regulatory vacuum in producer coun-
tries (Ruysschaert & Salles, 2014). Thus, it created a set of certifica-
tion rules (principles and criteria) to minimize adverse social and
environmental effects of oil palm expansion. In some cases,
national interpretations were developed to better align principles
and criteria with national conditions. By 2018, 19% of global palm
oil production was RSPO certified (Lyons-White & Knight, 2018).
In addition to RSPO, many companies have in recent years
made, often supplementary, commitments to zero deforestation.
Notably under the New York Declaration on Forests, they have
committed themselves to eliminating deforestation from their sup-
ply chains of so-called high forest risk commodities, such as palm
oil, soy, pulp and paper, and beef, by no later than 2020 (Jopke &
Schoneveld, 2018). According to one estimate, 96% of the global
palm oil supply is linked to one of these commitments (Pirard,
Gnych, Pacheco & Lawry, 2015).
Despite their socio-environmental ambition, such transnational
initiatives have been criticized for their limited effectiveness at
scale and failure to systematically reconcile conservation and
development objectives (Higgins & Richards, 2019; Lyons-White
& Knight, 2018). RSPO, for example, has been criticized for being
dominated by commercial interests, for depoliticizing contentious
issues, for focusing exclusively on North–South trade relationships,
externalizing sectoral authority and power, not being sufficiently
pro-poor and failure to account for the local socio-political-legal
context (Higgins & Richards, 2019; Pichler, 2013). In turn, zero
deforestation commitments typically fail to acknowledge external-
ity risks and may further exacerbate processes of market bifurca-
tion (Jopke & Schoneveld, 2018; Pacheco, Schoneveld, Dermawan,
Komarudin & Djama, 2018). RSPO governs an amount smaller than
20% of global production while less stringent emerging markets
such as China, Russia, India, and Pakistan represent a large share
of global consumption. Companies that are unwilling or unable
to meet supply chain standards can simply target these countries,
further consolidating so-called shadow markets (Jopke &
Schoneveld, 2018; Schleifer & Sun, 2018).
A particularly problematic issue with both initiatives is that
they risk excluding large numbers of smallholders in the sector
from benefiting from formal certified markets. Capacity and
resource constraints typically pose significant compliance barriers
for smallholders. As a result, they are increasingly alienated from
standards-driven markets (Astari & Lovett, 2019; Schoneveld,
Van Der Haar, Ekowati, Andrianto, Komarudin, Okarda, Jelsma, &
Pacheco, 2019).
Consumer countries have also implemented demand-side regu-
lations to further stimulate sustainable production. One of the
most relevant to palm oil is the European Union’s (EU) revised
Renewable Energy Directive (RED II), which imposes significant
restrictions on the use of crude palm oil (CPO) in the European
energy mix. This decision attracted significant consternation by
major producing countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia over




ZAE-Palma Developed by Embrapa (the Brazilian Agricultural
Research Corporation), it considers agro-ecological
suitability and accounts for restricted areas (e.g.,
primary forests, areas deforested since 2008,
indigenous territories, and conservation units). More
than 29 million ha in the Amazon were identified as
suitable for development; 12 million of these
hectares are in Pará. It was approved as Presidential
Decree 7172 in 2010.
Draft bill Draft bill (119) prepared by the federal government
and submitted to Congress in 2013. It establishes the
SPOPP by, for example, complementing Presidential
Decree 7172 forbidding the suppression of primary
forests in order to plant oil palm, plantations outside
the limits established by ZAE-Palma, among several
others. The most controversial issue relates to the
possibility to restore legal reserves with oil palm.1
Since 2015, the bill has been awaiting rapporteur
designation at a Senate commission. In 2018, there
had been no further developments.
Palm Oil Federal
Chamber (POFC)
Created in 2010, the POFC is a consultative body to
promote dialogue between government, private
sector, and civil society. It includes representatives of
federal bodies (ministries of Agriculture, Livestock
and Supply (MAPA), Agrarian Development (MDA),
Mining and Energy (MME), Environment (MMA),
Development, Industry and International Trade
(MDIC), Embrapa and Civil House) and
representatives of producers, consumers, and
workers. By 2017, it had held 25 meetings.
Research &
development
US$ 18.75 million2 over 10–12 years to be allocated
to research & development. Priority areas include
genetic improvement, increased seedling production
and strengthening of international partnerships, and
development of technical assistance capabilities of
technical service providers.
PRONAF Eco Established in 2007, PRONAF Eco is a credit line
available for smallholders. Since SPOPP in 2010,
major requirements include a maximum of 10 ha of
palm oil, a signed contract endorsed by the
smallholder representative organization (FETAGRI,
the Pará state Agricultural Workers Federation), a
minimum purchasing price, and the obligation for
the contracting company to provide inputs at market




Other credit lines for medium/large holders were
revised to include oil palm.
1 The Forest Code created two important long-lasting concepts, namely the area
of permanent preservation (APP) and legal reserves. A legal reserve is a proportion
of a rural property that should remain forested, while an APP is a sensitive area such
as a riverside, hilltop, or steep slope that should be protected from conversion. The
Forest Code required that 80% of a rural property should be maintained as a legal
reserve in the Legal Amazon. State governments may, however, reduce the size of a
legal reserve from 80% to 50% by designating certain areas as agricultural produc-
tion zones through Ecological–Economic Zoning (ZEE) plans. This is the case in
northeast Pará, for example, where oil palm plantations have expanded.
2 Amounts have been converted from Brazilian real (BRL) at an exchange rate of
BRL 3.2 per US dollar (1 June 2015).
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transnationally, producer governments are increasingly taking
actions to prevent externalization of regulatory authority with -
what some perceive to be – competing regulatory initiatives
(Hidayat et al., 2018; McCarthy, Gillespie, & Zen, 2012). In 2011,
Indonesia began to design a mandatory certification system based
on domestic regulations in the form of Indonesian Sustainable
Palm Oil (ISPO). A few years later, Malaysia implemented the
Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard that also intends
to become mandatory. These initiatives are regarded by some as a
reaction against transnational interference and as strategies to
undermine RSPO legitimacy (Hospes & Kentin, 2014). According
to many producer governments, transnational initiatives such as
the RSPO do not align well with domestic economic and rural
development goals (Ruysschaert, Carter, & Cheyns, 2019). By devel-
oping their own certification standards, Indonesia and Malaysia, on
paper at least, can become more equipped to align global concerns,
such as climate change, with domestic priorities, such as economic
development and poverty reduction (Higgins & Richards, 2019).
Despite some enthusiasm about improved national action, critics
have pointed to the tensions of such initiatives with more rigorous
transnational standards and a tendency to prioritize economic
development over environmental considerations (Meijaard &
Sheil, 2019). Moreover, there is also a lack of clarity regarding
the benefits for smallholders and doubts about the government
capacity and willingness to implement and enforce such rules
(Hidayat et al., 2018).
2.2. Palm oil governance in Brazil
Where countries like Malaysia and Indonesia developed more
reactionary regulatory initiatives seeking to appease international
supply chain pressures, Brazil adopted a different model. Long
dependent on soy and looking to diversify its biodiesel feedstock
sources, and recognizing the high forest and social risk associated
with oil palm expansion elsewhere, the government established
the Sustainable Palm Oil Production Program (SPOPP) in 2010 to
regulate expansion in the Amazon biome (Villela, Jaccoud, Rosa,
& Freitas, 2014). That was a response to a looming global energy
crisis and the enactment of the Brazilian Biodiesel Law (Law
11.097, 13/01/2005) in 2005 (Andrade & Miccolis, 2011). SPOPP
was firmly rooted in national policy priorities and market objec-
tives, preempting rather than responding to adverse sectoral
effects. Since the Brazilian palm oil value chain at that time largely
served domestic end-markets that only marginally considered
transnational initiatives, SPOPP was neither a response to or
inspired by externally imposed rules (Brandão & Schoneveld,
2015).
SPOPP principally sought to stimulate private-sector invest-
ments in the palm oil sector in support of its domestic biodiesel
targets and agricultural development policies, without undermin-
ing ongoing efforts to protect high conservation value ecosystems.
Moreover, the agricultural sector in the Amazon has been tradi-
tionally dominated by large-scale plantation systems. SPOPP
sought to incentivize more meaningful integration of smallholders,
who had long been alienated by and at times conflicted with
agribusiness interests (Córdoba, Selfa, Abrams, & Sombra, 2018).
Being more labor than capital intensive, oil palm cultivation is
more compatible with smallholder production systems than com-
mercial crops such as soy.
To achieve these objectives, the program introduced six specific
instruments (see Table 1), with two deserving special attention.
The first is the Agro-Ecological Zoning of Oil Palm in Deforested
Areas of the Amazon (ZAE-Palma). It identifies areas available to
oil palm cultivation that had been deforested before 2008 and do
not contain or conflict with primary forests, conservations units,3
and indigenous territories. The second is a credit line for small-
holders created under the Program to Support Family Farming
(PRONAF) called PRONAF Eco, which promotes the inclusion,
through contract farming, of smallholder farmers in the sector.
PRONAF Eco provides a loan at concessionary interest rates of up
to US$25,000 to smallholders to cultivate oil palm on up to 10 ha
of land. To receive the loan, smallholders are required to enter into
a 25-year contract with a company, who in turn is required to com-
mit to providing inputs and technical assistance to smallholders
and guaranteeing the purchase of fresh fruit bunches (FFB) at a
minimum price. Participation is, however, conditional on the
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(CAR), observance with ZAE-Palma and a family farmer certificate
stating that annual income exceeds US$6250 (DAP-V). Smallhold-
ers in Brazil are defined by law as a family who works in agricul-
ture, possesses no more than four ‘‘fiscal modes”, utilizes
predominantly family labor, and makes a living primarily through
their own production activities. A fiscal mode represents a unit of
economically viable farmland unit, ranging in Pará from 5 to 80 ha.
Companies are incentivized to contract smallholders since that
increases their supply base without a significant capital outlay.
Furthermore, under the Biodiesel Law, companies can gain prefer-
ential access to national biodiesel auctions through the so-called
Social Fuel Stamp (SFS) when sufficient feedstock is sourced
through smallholders (see Brandão & Schoneveld, 2015 for more
details).
In addition to specific instruments, the program builds on sev-
eral existing social, environmental, and economic regulations and
incentives in Brazil (Fig. 1). Besides social innovations such as
SFS, this includes the Forest Code as the flagship regulatory instru-
ment, which introduced amongst others the abovementioned CAR
system. On the economic side, investors have for a long time ben-
efited from lower tax rates and more favorable financing condi-
tions. This includes finance through FNO (North Constitutional
Fund) or FDA (Amazon Development Fund) and fiscal incentives
through the Superintendence of Development in the Amazon




SPOPP is principally a regulatory intervention that aims to alter
the actions of and relations between smallholders and companies
and, to a lesser extent, state agencies, with respect to land use, pro-
duction practices, contractual responsibilities and cost and benefit
flows, amongst others. However, we acknowledge that not all per-
tinent outcomes can be solely attributed to SPOPP, since these can
also be shaped both directly and indirectly by other factors (see
Fig. 2). In an evaluation of programmatic performance, it is critical
to isolate which successes and failures are attributable to the pro-
gram and which to other factors beyond the programmatic sphere
of control.
As also discussed by (Howes, Wortley, Potts, Dedekorkut-
Howes, Serrao-Neumann, Davidson, Nunn, 2017), one such factor
is the specific context in which a regulation is implemented,
enforced, and/or monitored. Infrastructure, market, political,
socio-cultural, climatic, and geographic characteristics, to name a
few, can both constrain or enable SPOPP implementation. While
some of these can be accounted for as an intervention is designed
or translated into practice, some contextual factors are beyond the
capacity of the intervention to anticipate or control such as, for
example, sectoral development compromised by crop pest or cli-
matic shocks.al regulations and incentives.
Fig. 2. Analytical framework.
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Some specific instruments introduced by the program build on,
complement, and leverage existing socio-environmental regula-
tions and incentives. In such a case, SPOPP can be credited for
explicitly seeking to exploit synergies and complementarities
(Lambin, Meyfroidt, Rueda, Blackman, Börner, Cerutti, Dietsch,
Jungmann, Lamarque, Lister, Walker, & Wunder, 2014), but not
necessarily for outcomes attributable to existing regulations or
institutional structures. An example is good employment condi-
tions at corporate plantations due to progressive labor laws and
well-capacitated enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, overall pro-
grammatic success and ability of SPOPP to deliver on its objectives
are strongly influenced by such synergies and complementarities.
Conversely, existing regulatory and institutional structures can
also frustrate SPOPP implementation. Programmatic failures attri-
butable to governance antagonisms cannot therefore be solely
attributable to SPOPP but do importantly provide insights into out-
come determinants.
Finally, private supply chain initiatives such as private stan-
dards, specific corporate zero-deforestation commitments, small-
holder policies and codes of conduct further contribute to or
detract from programmatic success (Lambin, Gibbs, Heilmayr,
Carlson, Fleck, Garrett, Walker, 2018). Given the sector’s domestic
market orientation, these are in principle not as relevant as in
other countries. Nevertheless, the extent to which environmental
and inclusivity considerations are integrated into corporate busi-
ness models undoubtably bears on outcomes and plays an impor-
tant mediating role.
3.2. Methodological approach
There is no official document clearly articulating SPOPP objec-
tives. Existing literature (e.g., Villela et al., 2014; Benami, Curran,
Cochrane, Venturieri, Franco, Kneipp, & Swartos, 2018; Córdoba
et al., 2018) tends to draw on secondary sources or public presen-
tations and speeches by government officials. By means of a review
of government SPOPP communications and documentation, nota-
bly a 2010 presidential speech in Tomé Açu, Presidential Decree
7172 in 2010 that instituted the ZAE-Palma, Project Law 119 from
2013 that instituted the SPOPP (though is still awaiting congres-
sional approval), and two MDA public information booklets, it is
clear SPOPP design is influenced by three overarching objectives,
namely: (a) preventing oil palm-induced deforestation, (b) pro-
moting smallholder inclusion, and (c) sectoral expansion and
competitiveness.
In order to evaluate whether these intended programmatic out-
comes were realized, we drew on both existing literature and pri-5
mary research activities. In order to causally attribute outcomes to
SPOPP, we relied on expert opinions. Specific activities undertaken
under each step are summarized below.
3.2.1. Literature review of outcomes
We first conducted a systematic literature review. This involved
developing a database of published journal articles and grey liter-
ature in English and Portuguese that referred to palm oil in Pará.
The state holds Brazil’s largest palm oil producing area, accounting
for approximately 88% of the total hectarage in the country
(Abrapalma, 2017). Since this article is concerned with oil palm
development under SPOPP, only literature published after 2010
was considered.
Based on this literature search, three knowledge gaps were
identified that impede our ability to conduct a comprehensive pro-
grammatic evaluation. Specifically, extracted literature failed to
provide insights into and/or explicitly assess (1) forest footprint
of smallholder oil palm cultivation; (2) ability of smallholders to
successfully adopt oil palm as a profitable income generating activ-
ity; and (3) sectoral competitiveness.
3.2.2. Primary data collection activities
In order to address knowledge gap 1, we manually mapped
5160 ha of smallholder oil palm planted after 2010 (620 plots)
through visual interpretation of high-resolution satellite imagery
available through Google Earth. 436 of the mapped plots were
identified through the CARs of smallholders contracted to four
major companies. The remaining plots (184) were identified
through visual inspection. Based on data from (Abrapalma, 2017),
we captured an estimated 42% of the total area planted with oil
palm by smallholders since 2010. The map we produced was laid
onto official spatial deforestation data (PRODES) for the period
2010–18. We further triangulated these results through visual
interpretation of high-resolution SPOT imagery from 2010.
In order to address knowledge gap 2, we adopted the expert
knowledge method to develop a smallholder ‘performance’ typol-
ogy (Alvarez, Aaas, Descheemaeker, Tittonell, & Groot, 2014).
Smallholder households were assigned to clusters through a partic-
ipatory workshop with managers from the three largest oil palm
companies in Pará, which collectively source from approximately
two-thirds of Pará’s oil palm contract farmers. Two indicators were
considered indicative of smallholder performance: productivity
and adoption of best management practices. Productivity is mea-
sured by the number of tons produced per year compared to the
average expected productivity for the relevant stand age. Degree
of adoption of best management practices is a qualitative indicator
companies use to assess contract farmer’s default risks. Using these
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4 groups.
We recognize the limitation of using productivity and adoption
of best management practices as proxies for determining the abil-
ity of smallholders to successfully adopt oil palm (see for example
(Prowse, 2012) for a discussion on successful and failed contract
farming cases). Even so, this was the only feasible way to make a
consistent comparison across different companies and datasets
due to corporate reluctance to disclose confidential information.
To address knowledge gap 3, we collected data from official
governmental and other secondary sources. Data on imports,
exports and production was obtained from government (MDIC,
2019) and the sector association (Abrapalma, 2017). Production
cost data was collected from conference presentations and techni-
cal documents (Brito, 2014a; Fry, 2016; Veiga & Rodrigues, 2016;
Yokoyama, 2017). The accuracy of information was verified
through expert consultations.
3.2.3. Causal attribution
Following the analysis of outcomes, we used our analytical
framework to evaluate how those outcomes can be attributed to
SPOPP. This evaluation was based on 193 semi-structured key
informant interviews across the state of Pará (Table 2). These inter-
views focused on stakeholder perceptions of outcome determi-
nants and causal pathways. This is a commonly employed and
veracious approach in impact evaluations (Boyce & Neale, 2006;
Peersman, 2014). This analysis also relied on observations from
field visits to the operations of eight of the nine companies func-
tional in the state, nine municipalities (Acará, Baião, Bujaru, Con-
córdia do Pará, Mãe do Rio, Mocajuba, Moju, Tailândia and Tomé-
Açu), and 55 visits to communities directly or indirectly affected
by oil palm expansion.
4. Results
4.1. Deforestation
Five secondary sources that evaluated the impact of oil palm
expansion on forests were found (Table 3). According to Benami
et al. (2018), only 0.8% of oil palm planted by companies since
SPOPP establishment involved the conversion of primary forests,
and 3% involved conversion of secondary forests. A recent study
by (Almeida, Vieira & Ferraz, 2020) corroborates these findings
by demonstrating that approximately 1% of the area planted with
oil palm involved primary forest conversion. This is a marked
improvement over the pre-SPOPP era, when between 2006 and
2010 an estimated 4.1% of oil palm was established at the expense
of primary forests and 4.9% at the expense of secondary forests
(Benami et al., 2018). A study by Vijay, Pimm, Jenkins & Smith
(2016) found that between 1989 and 2013 39.4% of oil palm expan-
sion involved conversion of primary forest. Almeida et al. (2020)
additionally estimate that approximately 30% of oil palm estab-Table 2
Key informant interviews.
Type number




Representatives of municipal institutions 33
Policymakers at state and federal levels 7
Representatives of companies 32
Representatives of banks 5
Others 4
6
lished in select study sites since 1991 involved forest conversion.
Noting that expansions since 2010 contributed only marginally
to deforestation, these figures suggest that earlier plantations were
considerably more likely to have been established on forestland.
These figures are also in line with estimates from Agropalma, one
of Brazil largest palm oil producers. They acknowledge that 35%
of their oil palm involved primary forests conversion until their
zero-deforestation commitment came into effect in 2002
(Agropalma, 2013).
However, a major omission in all studies is that they only focus
on corporate plantation expansion. Whether smallholder oil palm
expansion contributed to deforestation since 2010 has yet to be
explored. The main results of our gap filling activities are presented
below (Table 4). Additional information can be found in Annex 1.
Results show that, like corporate plantation expansion since
2010, smallholder expansion has taken place largely on non-
forestland. Visual interpretation of SPOT imagery suggested that
only 44 ha of land was deforested from the 1395 ha analyzed,
equivalent to a 3.2% deforestation rate. However, extrapolating
results to the total area mapped, assuming that PRODES consis-
tently overestimates deforestation by 102% (as identified in the
sampled area), we estimate that of the 5162 ha mapped, 69 ha of
forest was converted; equivalent to 1.3% of the total area mapped.
These results suggest that under SPOPP only few smallholders
deforested land to establish their plantations. In sum, based on pri-
mary and secondary data, we estimate that since the launch of
SPOPP in 2010, oil palm establishment involved the conversion
of 0.8% and 1.3% of primary forests for corporate and smallholder
plantations, respectively.
4.2. Smallholder inclusion
Literature on smallholder inclusion under SPOPP (Table 5) sug-
gests that SPOPP’s smallholder inclusion targets were not met.
Only 1313 smallholders planted oil palm under SPOPP since
2010. This represents only 24% of initial inclusion targets estab-
lished by the companies at the time SPOPP was launched (4850
families) (Brandão, De Castro & Futemma, 2019). In total, not more
than 1% of Pará’s smallholder properties contain oil palm. Even in
the municipalities with a higher concentration of contracted farm-
ers, oil palm has not become a dominant crop. It is planted in only
8% of smallholder properties in Tailândia, 7% in Tomé Açu, and 6%
in São Domingos do Capim (Abrapalma, 2017; IBGE, 2017).
With respect to the ability of smallholders to successfully adopt
oil palm as a profitable income generating activity, no robust evi-
dence has been presented in existing literature that can be attrib-
uted convincingly to SPOPP. While Santos, Homma, Sena, Júnior,
Menezes & Monteiro (2014) suggest that oil palm cultivation is
comparatively profitable for smallholders and Homma, Menezes,
Monteiro, Santos, Rebello, Costa & Mota (2014) suggest that small-
holders are by and large satisfied with adoption, these studies con-
cern high-profile pilot schemes established prior to SPOPP. Such
schemes were under political scrutiny, with companies pressured
to demonstrate the viability of oil palm contract farming.
Results from our participatory cluster analysis revealed that sig-
nificant differences in performance can be observed between farm-
ers (Fig. 3). This ranges from very successful (Group A, 17%) to
critical (Group D, 12%). Group A (very successful, 17%) comprises
highly motivated farmers that comply fully with best management
practices and are more productive than expectations. Such small-
holders experience positive returns on their investment, enabling
significant wealth creation compared to traditional alternatives
such as cassava. Group B (successful, 29%) consists of farmers that
do comply with best management practices but are only averagely
productive. For these farmers oil palm cultivation does neverthe-
less provide an important source of stable income to maintain a
Table 3




Study area Method Results
Benami et al. (2018) Y Northeast Pará (includes nearly all
known commercial oil palm
plantations)
Visual inspection techniques,
field and site visits and
consultations
0.8% of planted oil palm involved deforestation of
primary forests and 3% of secondary forests since the
SPOPP started in 2010
Furumo and Aide
(2017)
Y 12 Latin American countries
including Brazil
Random Forest (RF) tree-
based classifier in MODIS
collection
Around 40% of replacement of woody vegetation since
2000
Vijay et al. (2016) Y Sample sites in 20 countries
including Brazil
Visual inspection and linear
extrapolation of sample sites
39.4% of deforestation between 1989 and 2013




30% of deforestation of primary forests since 1991 but
only 1% since 2010 until 2013.
Agropalma, (2013) N Agropalma plantations Sustainability report
(company own analysis)
35% of their oil palm involved primary forests conversion
until 2002
Table 4




Total area of smallholder oil palm in Pará 12,418 100%
Total area of smallholder oil palm mapped 5162 42%
Smallholder area mapped overlapping with PRODES 144 2.8%
Total area of smallholder oil palm mapped analyzed
with SPOT
1395 27%
Smallholder area analyzed with SPOT overlapping
with PRODES
89 6.4%
Smallholder area analyzed with SPOT involving forest
conversion
44 3.2%
Estimate deforestation in smallholder area mapped 69 1.3%
Fig. 3. Performance of SPOPP contract farmers (%). Source: Representation of
own data.
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farmers that have not been able to fulfill productivity expectations,
typically because they fail to devote the necessary labor or lacked
the capacity to comply with agronomic guidelines. Finally, Group D
(critical, 13%) comprises farmers that have found themselves in a
critical situation. They have systemically neglected advice from
extension officers and are confronted by a large yield gap or have
completely abandoned their plantations. Illness, old age, and/or
personal issues such as divorces, family conflicts or youth exodus
typically underlie this.
As can be observed, most farmers (54%) fall into the latter two
groups (precarious and critical). Company experience suggests that
such farmers will likely be unable to develop economically viable
oil palm operations over time and, thus, be able to fulfill their debt
obligations. These results differ from Santos et al. (2014) and
Homma et al. (2014), suggesting that their findings cannot be
directly extrapolated to SPOPP.Table 5








N Northeast Pará Data collection and
descriptive stats








Brandão et al. (2018) N Northeast Pará Data collection and
econometric analysis
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4.3. Sector development and competitiveness
The literature review (Table 6) indicates the total planted area
with oil palm tripled between 2006 and 2014 and doubled since
the launch of SPOPP. Georeferenced data indicates a growth from
70,691 ha to 116,748 ha in 2010, and to 218,917 in 2014
(Benami et al., 2018). According to official data (Abrapalma,
2017), 207,000 ha of oil palm was planted by 2017, including areas
planted by smallholders. Nevertheless, despite ambitious expan-
sion plans, initial projections have not been met. In 2016, the three
major new entrants into the sector only managed to cultivate 72%
of the planned hectarage under corporate plantation and 24% of theResults
1313 smallholder families with contracts under SPOPP since 2010, which
represents only 24% of total company commitments (4850 families)
Around 50% of satisfaction identified among smallholders
83.9% satisfaction identified among smallholders
Average monthly income is 4 times than minimum wage
Direct exclusion of credit blacklisted farmers and low-income farmers, plus
indirect exclusion of land and labor constrained households.
Table 6
Literature review results related to sectoral development.
Source Peer-reviewed Study area Method Results




Planted area growth from 70,691 ha to 116,748 ha in 2010,
and to 218,917 in 2014
Abrapalma, (2017) N Northeast Pará Collection of own data Total area of 207,000 ha in 2016
Brandão et al. (2019) Y Northeast Pará Secondary data
collection
By 2016 new entrants have only managed to achieve 72% and
24% of their expansion goals in terms of own area and
contract farming area. Expansion halted in 2015.
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only two out of the six announced palm oil mills were in fact built
by new entrants, with none of them having invested in biodiesel
processing. In 2016, the sector had a processing capacity of 731
metric tons (MT) of FFBs per hour, below the 1020 MT announced
in initial plans. Since 2015, expansion ceased as CPO and oil prices
declined and new entrants started to explore options to divest
from the sector (Brandão et al., 2019). By late 2019, two of the
three companies had sold their operations.
While the limited secondary evidence suggests that sectoral
expansion goals of SPOPP have largely been unfulfilled, whether
sufficient expansion was realized to reduce dependency on foreign
markets and develop a competitive domestic palm oil industry has
not been evaluated to date. However, as Fig. 4 suggests, while pro-
duction has increased in recent years (largely due to maturing
trees, not expansion of hectarage), the national palm oil deficit
has not been significantly reduced. Similarly, based on export fig-
ures, it neither appears that Brazilian palm oil is capable to pene-
trate foreign (premium) markets, with few exceptions.
Moreover, sectoral competitiveness does not appear to have
improved. Our estimates of production costs suggest that the sec-
tor is hampered by some of the highest production cost in the
world (Fig. 5). Production costs in Indonesia and Malaysia are gen-
erally between US$300–400 per MT/CPO, while in Brazil compa-
nies tend to spend US$675 per MT/CPO. This does not differ
much and sometimes even exceeds global CPO prices since 2014.
These high production costs can largely be attribute to the high
labor costs in Brazil, which can be as high as 75% of total produc-
tion costs, according to expert interviews (Yokoyama, 2017; D. Di
Martino, personal communication, 2018). According to
(Yokoyama, 2017), an average worker in Brazil costs US$ 11,783
per year, while in Colombia one worker on average costs US$
10,250, in Malaysia US$ 6135 and in Indonesia US$ 2686).
Therefore, despite sectoral expansion until 2015, results suggest
SPOPP expectations have not been fulfilled and Brazilian CPO can-
not compete with those from other major producing countries. The
vast majority of Brazilian CPO as a result merely serves domestic
markets. Only differentiated products such as organic— and
RSPO-certified CPO—which are still a niche activity in the Ama-
zon—have been exported. Only one company currently sells such
certified CPO.1 Agropalma adopted a zero-deforestation commitment in 2002.
2 Only Natura, among the main domestic buyers, has formalized a zero-
deforestation commitment.5. Governance analysis
The above analysis of primary and secondary information sug-
gests that oil palm expansion in the SPOPP-era involved compara-
tively little deforestation but failed to meaningfully involve
smallholders at scale and improve sectoral competitiveness. This
section seeks to attribute these outcomes to SPOPP, employing
the analytical framework presented in Section 3.1. Before exploring
the additionality of SPOPP for each outcome domain, we first
examine how contextual factors, domestic governance, and private
supply chain initiatives shape outcomes.8
5.1. Explaining positive deforestation outcomes
5.1.1. Context
Oil palm investments were mostly made in landscapes with
substantial availability of degraded lands and low deforestation
rates (Carvalho, Silveira, Rovere, & Iwama, 2015), as is the case in
most of northeast Pará. Due to the large operational costs and cap-
ital invested in milling facilities and the comparatively high labor
intensiveness, oil palm plantations have to date been developed
near major ports and more populous areas. Typically, many of
these areas have already been deforested long ago. Frontier areas
with abundant stocks of forests were not attractive to companies,
partly explaining low deforestation rates.
In addition to geographic factors, socio-political dynamics also
played an important role. Several influential NGOs operating in
the Amazon actively monitor deforestation and confront compa-
nies complicit in deforestation. Larger companies particularly
exposed to reputational risk tend to avoid activities that expose
them to civil society scrutiny.
5.1.2. Supply chain initiatives
Private supply chain initiatives in the palm oil sector do not
appear to have significantly shaped outcomes. In fact, only one
investor has formally made a commitment to eliminate deforesta-
tion from its supply chain, which coincidentally was made before
SPOPP was launched.1 Furthermore, only one new entrant, ADM,
commenced operations with a plan in place to certify under RSPO.
This requires them to avoid planting activities on areas deforested
since 2006. The other six large investors did not develop any zero
deforestation policies. Because the lion’s share of CPO supplies Bra-
zil’s domestic market, which does not require any certification and
generally does not expect zero-deforestation commitments from
their suppliers,2 there are few supply chain pressures that demand
or incentivize improved corporate environmental conduct. This sug-
gests that most merely complied with domestic regulations, with
only a few companies seeking to differentiate themselves through
their environmental performance.
5.1.3. Domestic regulatory frameworks and alignment
The Brazilian Amazon in general and, in particular, the munici-
palities where oil palm expanded experienced a decline in defor-
estation rates of between 70 and 80% since 2010 (Moutinho,
Guerra, & Azevedo-Ramos, 2016). That was partly a product of
increased federal government commitment and action to reducing
deforestation rates in the Amazon in the same period. This is
reflected in hallmark regulations such as the Forest Code and the
Environmental Crime Law, along with investments into a modern
surveillance infrastructure by federal and state agencies. This
was further strengthened by technical innovations such as the
availability of satellite imagery, the implementation of the CAR
Fig. 4. Brazil’s palm oil market trends 2010–18 in tons of CPO + PKO). Source: MDIC (2019) and Abrapalma (2017).
Fig. 5. Average production and labor costs between 2010 and 2015 (in US$). Source: Fry (2016), Yokoyama (2017), Brito (2014a) and Veiga & Rodrigues (2016)
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& Busch, 2016). With these regulatory and technical advances,
many oil palm investors, like most other landowners in the Ama-
zon, were discouraged from flaunting new rules, given the large
capital investments at stake.
5.1.4. SPOPP’s additionality
While the geographic and socio-political context and domestic
regulatory frameworks certainly explain low oil palm induced
deforestation, SPOPP can also be credited. The design of ZAE–
Palma—the SPOPP’s main environmental instrument—offered clear
rules on areas designated for production, which helped guide com-
panies’ land acquisition practices, according to company managers
(J. Menezes, personal communication, 2017). This not only helped
companies identify where production would be legally acceptable,
but also encouraged expansion in low forest risk areas such as
Northeast Pará.
While SPOPP merely contributed to reduced corporate defor-
estation rates, its role was more pronounced in the smallholder
sector. Two important components were the obligation to submit
a CAR to apply for PRONAF Eco and the successful passing of a
Decree on ZAE–Palma that forbids credit access to those located
on forested lands. Thus, SPOPP was able to directly prevent the
expansion of smallholder oil palm plantations in areas that had
been illegally deforested. Interviews with company managers and
bank representatives fully support this conclusion (D. Di Martino,
personal communication, 2018; F. Castro, personal communica-
tion, 2017). According to some respondents that asked for anonym-
ity, the small areas that had been deforested by smallholders can9
be ascribed to irregularities in the smallholder credit approval pro-
cess, as some personnel perceived a pressure not to obstruct sector
expansion. Several analysts in the Amazon (e.g. Assunção,
Gandour, Pessoa, & Rocha, 2017) demonstrated that Brazil’s envi-
ronmental governance framework has limited capacity to effec-
tively regulate smallholder deforestation. The reasons are the
higher transaction costs and technical difficulties identifying
small-scale deforestation through available satellite imagery.
Hence, low deforestation rates by oil palm smallholders does point
to the additionality of SPOPP.
5.2. Explaining the mixed smallholder scheme outcomes
5.2.1. Context
Contextual factors contributed both positively and negatively to
observed outcomes. The small absolute number of contracted
smallholders and the large share of farmers in a precarious or crit-
ical situation can partly be explained by three contextual factors.
First, defaulting on loans is a structural problem in the region, with
many households blacklisted for PRONAF Eco purposes due to fail-
ure to repay their loans under past PRONAF projects. Second, con-
tract farming, especially through governmental intervention, was a
relatively new phenomenon in the region. Given the historical dis-
trust between private sector investors and smallholders and the
intense (political) polarization of ‘‘agribusiness” and ‘‘family farm-
ing” interests (Favareto, 2016), many smallholders and unions
were skeptical about being locked into long-term contracts with
companies. Third, Brazil’s economic slowdown and declining CPO
and oil prices, particularly since 2015, along with corruption
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deterioration of sectoral prospects. This resulted in a reevaluation
of corporate expansion plans.
Some of the positive outcomes for smallholders can also be
explained by contextual factors. Oil palm smallholders benefitted
from a well-organized and dynamic smallholder movement under
the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG),
with strong ties to the ruling government and the president him-
self.3 Especially during the early years of SPOPP, unions not only
helped craft and monitor compliance with rules on smallholder
inclusion, but also mediated between smallholders and companies.
In doing so, they influenced the content of contracts between indi-
vidual companies and their smallholders, and the below-discussed
inclusion criteria.
5.2.2. Supply chain initiatives
In addition to the official inclusion criteria, companies also
adopted their own criteria that impacted expansion and scheme
inclusiveness. Despite minor variations, these included criteria
pertaining to: (a) access to roads, (b) proximity to mill(s), (c) loca-
tion within geographic farming cluster, (d) financial and crop man-
agement capacity of smallholders, (e) availability of sufficient
capable household labor, and (f) owning at least 25 ha of land.
While many of these criteria were motivated by commercial inter-
ests (e.g. transaction cost management and smallholder productiv-
ity), in certain cases, companies sought to minimize negative socio-
economic spillovers and reputational risks. In specific, minimum
land requirements were imposed to reduce food security risks.
Because PRONAF Eco only permits up to 10 ha of oil palm, compa-
nies wanted to ensure enough additional land was available to cul-
tivate food crops. Some companies even developed planting
guidelines that encouraged food intercropping between immature
oil palms. These criteria partly contributed to reducing food secu-
rity risks and preventing (more) households incapable of effec-
tively producing oil palm (e.g. due to labor constraints) entering
into production contracts. They also impeded the expansion of
smallholder schemes and excluded more marginalized households
(for both good and bad).
However, according to innumerous statements of unions and
farmers, the large number of critical and vulnerable contract farm-
ers can also be attributed to a declining quality of corporate exten-
sion support since 2015. As sector’s fortunes deteriorated,
companies struggled to successfully compete. Innumerous farmers
complained of poor technical assistance and input provisioning,
notably delayed fertilizers. This is partially a result of inefficient
planning and lack of local knowledge. Several new investors had
no prior experience with primary production in the Amazon. As
they struggled to find the necessary number of qualified farmers
and were pressured to meet expansion targets, many companies
began to explore opportunities for raising eligibility rates. That
included relaxing their own eligibility criteria and pressuring
banks to simplify and facilitate credit approvals. In many cases,
farmers that did not meet eligibility criteria were included; notably
single-person and/or elderly households). This also resulted in
higher degree of geographic dispersion, with many farmers scat-
tered across the landscape, leading to increased service and input
delivery and logistical costs.
5.2.3. Domestic regulatory frameworks and alignment
In the mid-2000s, the Brazilian government began to address
poverty and pervasive social inequalities more comprehensively.
Cash-transfer programs and policies targeting rural populations3 Under the Lula da Silva administration, the MDA assumed greater political
relevance since it represented the interests of the electoral support base of Lula’s
Workers Party.
10such as PRONAF began to play a critical role in rural develop-
ment in peripheral states. SPOPP’s social inclusion objectives
cannot be divorced from the federal government’s more pro-
poor policy stance (Burton, 2013). PRONAF Eco, for example,
builds on the existing PRONAF structure, which includes a large
network of banks, unions, public and private technical assistance
providers. This enables PRONAF to provide credits at subsidized
interest rates and with a high-risk tolerance. Inclusion under
SPOPP was enabled by aligning with and leveraging these exist-
ing structures.
Governmental support was also of critical importance. The
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in the first years of
SPOPP was actively encouraging oil palm companies to integrate
smallholders under SFS, mediating when issues arose and moni-
toring performance. However, this changed when the former
president was impeached, and the new conservative right-wing
coalition entered government. Consequently, the MDA was rele-
gated to a lower administrative and operational level, which
diminished its effective capacity to mediate and monitor. This
reduced ability became especially apparent when it failed to
intervene when corporate service and input delivery issues
arose, and an increasing number of farmers were risking default.
Smallholder organizations consequently also experienced
reduced access to financial resources and political influence,
which eroded their capacity to effectively represent their con-
stituent’s interests as corporate commitment to smallholder
schemes began to wane.5.2.4. SPOPP’s additionality
The introduction of PRONAF Eco under SPOPP incentivized com-
panies to contract smallholders, particularly in the early years of
SPOPP. Companies were able to expand the hectarage under their
control without bearing the establishment costs and default risks,
which were borne by public banks instead. For the more successful
farmers, the design of the smallholder scheme was also hugely
important. It enabled them to develop capacities to effectively cul-
tivate a new crop and derive a stable income, as SPOPP ensured
that technical assistance was provided, prices were predictable
and marketing risks low due to the 25-year guaranteed offtake
contract. This helped address pervasive market failures confronting
smallholders in the Amazon, who ordinarily have to contend with
an absence of technical assistance, high price fluctuations and
uncertain market access. Even considering lesser successful farm-
ers, compared to other credit schemes, PRONAF Eco has compara-
tively low credit default rates, according to bank managers (F.
Castro, personal communication, 2017; A. Pereira personal com-
munication, 2017).4
However, as both companies and smallholders encountered dif-
ficulties on the ground, SPOPP failure to institute mechanisms to
monitor and resolve implementation issues became increasingly
apparent. Continuous fine-tuning of instruments would have been
needed to collectively resolve emerging problems, but in the
absence of structures to facilitate learning and dialogue SPOPP
proved to be largely unresponsive. Analysis of the state and federal
chambers’ agendas reveal that none of the relevant issues were
tabled in discussions, nor were smallholder organizations granted
a space to voice emerging concerns. SPOPP would have benefitted
from adaptive management strategies that provide more flexible
and collaborative ways to deal with changing contexts (Wyborn,
2015).4 In several cases, unsuccessful smallholder projects have been informally taken
over by successful neighbors or relatives. This has been regarded as a viable
alternative to prevent credit default. However, it may also promote inequality.
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5.3.1. Context
In addition to the economic and political turmoil discussed
above, we also identified technological and logistical factors that
have impeded sector development. Firstly, the planting material
commonly available in Brazil have undermined competitiveness.
The African oil palm (Elaeis guineensis Jacq.) is the most commonly
used variety in Brazil, as it is the highest yielding (up to 7 MT of
CPO per ha/year). However, publicly available data suggests that
the sector in Brazil on average only attained a yield of 1.5 MT of
CPO tons per ha/year in 2015 (Abrapalma, 2017). While the large
area of immature palms contributes to this, even the most produc-
tive companies with predominantly mature palm only attain yields
of 3.4 MT of CPO per ha/year (Agropalma, 2018). This large yield
gap severely undermines competitiveness. The variety is suscepti-
ble to bud rot, a disease characterized by leaf yellowing prevalent
in Latin American countries, though not in other producing regions,
significantly contributes to this. While public and private R&D have
enabled introduction of several varieties resistant to bud rot in the
1980s,5 these materials have not been able to bring significant
improvements to yields, and were associated with comparatively
high costs due to the need for assisted fertilization.
The second contextual factor is logistics. According to industry
representatives (M. Brito, personal communication, 2017;
Yokoyama, 2017), it is cheaper for Brazil’s main palm oil buyers
in São Paulo to source from Malaysia (even including transporta-
tions and tariffs) than from the Amazon. Many companies ascribe
the comparatively high transportation costs to the lack of return
loads on freight exchanges between ports. This depresses prices
for domestically sourced CPO. Moreover, declining world prices
since 2014 and high transportation costs in northeast Pará due to
inter alia large distances between smallholders and mills, ineffi-
cient planning, and poor road quality further undermines
competitiveness.5.3.2. Supply chain initiatives
While only one company targeted premium markets through
differentiated product offerings (e.g. organic and RSPO certified),
the sector largely failed to adopt product differentiation strategies.
Business strategies were largely premised on two assumptions: a)
Brazil’s biodiesel industry would continue growing, and b) global
CPO prices would continue rising as Northern governments look
to deliver on their bioenergy targets and fossil fuel prices continue
their upwards trajectory. In practice, however, Brazilian palm oil
could not compete with cheaper alternatives, notably soy, in the
national auctions as CPO prices, contrary to expectations, declined
and demand for biodiesel feedstock stagnated due to low fossil fuel
prices. These business strategies at that time did not warrant large
investments in value addition or product differentiation and failed
to help position these companies to effectively compete outside
the energy sector. These assumptions also deterred investments
in process upgrading (e.g., mechanization, development of
improved varieties). As a result, few companies were able to reduce
their costs of production.6 Recognizing this problem, there is an ongoing debate in the Federal Chamber on
tariff protection with consumer industries lobbying for tariff reduction and palm oil
producers for tariff increase. The sector managed to temporarily protect the sector in
2016 by increasing the import tariff for CPO from 10 to 20%, but overall, the domestic
industry consumers have had more capacity to influence trade policies, according to
industry insiders.
7 The average biodiesel selling price in the auction amounted to US$ 0.62 per liter,
while average crude palm oil (CPO) production costs (excluding transportation costs5.3.3. Domestic regulatory frameworks and alignment
The Brazilian regulatory framework also did not prove amen-
able to improving sectoral competitiveness and enabling more
rapid expansion, especially due to Brazil labor laws and customs
policies. As discussed above, owing to its comparatively progres-
sive labor laws, labor costs in Brazil are considerably higher than5 Including seven African oil palm intraspecific new cultivars and an interspecific
hybrid cultivar of African oil palm and caiaué: BRS Manicoré.
11in most other palm oil producing countries. These emerged from
the country’s investment in institutional structures that facilitate
dialogue between trade unions and companies, as well as an active
and politically influential Labor Public Prosecutor Office (LPPO).
The LPPO even holds companies responsible for labor irregularities
on smallholder plantations.
Finally, some investors argue that custom policies also discrim-
inate against the Brazilian sector by not imposing import tariffs on
CPO from Colombia and Ecuador, despite Brazilian CPO being sub-
jected to a 5% tariff in those countries, and decreasing the import
tariff on PKO from 10% to 2% (Brito, 2014b). Although tariffs on
Malaysian and Indonesian CPO are levied, they are considered
insignificant to offset the cost disadvantage of Brazilian producers.6
5.3.4. SPOPP’s additionality
SPOPP principally sought to enable sector expansion by leverag-
ing existing biodiesel incentives and through further investments in
R&D. The biodiesel incentives only worked to the extent that they
attracted investors to the region but failed to create a palm-based
biodiesel market. Although the National Agency of Petroleum, Nat-
ural Gas and Biofuels sets a maximum reference price for its biodie-
sel auction, since June 2013 (the 31st auction) the average selling
price in most auctions tended to exceed the average cost of produc-
tion.7 Under these conditions, companies lack incentives to continue
targeted the energy sector, as per initial business strategies. The SFS
system consequently did not apply nor incentivize further small-
holder expansion, with no stamps to date having been allocated to
oil palm companies. Even though these issues became apparent at
an early stage, SPOPP did not address nor introduce new instruments
to protect against declining investor commitment to the sector. This
reflects SPOPPs dependency on incentivize structures beyond its con-
trol and failing to adequately (re)consider introducing incentivizes
specific to the sector.
Additionally, planned investments in R&D that were critical to
developing improved varieties to raise sector competitiveness
failed to materialize. SPOPP initially announced that US$ 18.75 mil-
lion would be invested in improving plant genetics and for seedling
production. However, it ended with political announcements.
According to industry insiders, given the current economic situa-
tion, the budget allocated to R&D was heavily cut.86. Discussion: managing trade-offs
While evaluating outcomes in isolation helped identify why
they materialized in a specific context, outcomes actually are inter-
dependent and involve trade-offs. Anticipating such trade-offs is
highly pertinent to development of new regulatory innovations
by enabling proponents to resolve sources of competition, intro-
duce safeguards and/or articulate compromises. Specifically, we
identify and discuss below two particularly significant trade-offs:
(1) between the viability of smallholder schemes and environmen-
tal and inclusivity objectives, and (2) between sectoral competi-
tiveness and labor rights/conditions and environmental
performance.and transesterification) amount—according to Breslin & Nesadurai (2014a)—to
approximately US$ 0.67 per liter.
8 Some companies such as Denpasa, Marborges and Agropalma, continue to invest
but mostly by their own means.
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environmentally responsible
Results show that some of the contract farming schemes failed
to include more marginalized smallholders because of the intro-
duction of eligibility criteria that were intended to reduce credit
default risk for public banks and corporate transaction costs and
maximize smallholder productive performance. Exclusion of black-
listed, less affluent and labor and land-constrained farmers no
doubt enhances the long-term viability of contract farming. How-
ever, it deprives important societal groups from benefiting from
market innovations from which they particularly stand to benefit.
Participation may not be a desirable livelihood option for all and
may risk trapping more vulnerable groups into cycles of debt.
Nonetheless, as a public intervention, more attention deserves to
be paid to impact on societal inequalities and alignment with
wider rural poverty alleviation objectives.
Likewise, deforestation restrictions imposed on smallholders at
the property level also contributed to excluding some groups,
especially those with too much forests contained on their plot to
cultivate the necessary 10 ha. As such, those that have avoided
deforestation in the past are penalizing. Furthermore, it limited
the amount of land available for expansion and the possibility to
form plantation clusters that could have reduced transportation
and service and input delivery costs. Relaxing such requirements,
while hypothetically socially and economically desirable, would
have severely undermined the sector’s environmental
performance.
SPOPP could have better anticipated such dilemmas and associ-
ated perverse outcomes. Specific strategies for farmers with high
risk of default or underperformance could, for example, have been
devised had SPOPP proponents more actively participated in
implementation. This could have entailed permitting and introduc-
ing special credit facilities for smaller plantations or alternative
cropping models (e.g. oil palm agroforestry) in order to include
land- and labor-constrained groups. Also, it could have explored
block farming opportunities to consolidate production, improve
corporate oversight and reduce transaction costs. In order to iden-
tify (the viability of) such options, SPOPP would have needed to
evolve and continue learning from practice and concerned stake-
holders. This not only would have required better monitoring
and communications, but also investments in institutional struc-
tures that enable adaptive management. In that respect, SPOPP in
hindsight was too technocratic.6.2. Sectoral competitiveness, labor conditions and environmental
responsibility
While competitiveness concerns reduced the ability of SPOPP to
deliver improved social performance, social considerations beyond
the scope of SPOPP did paradoxically also affect competitiveness.
High labor costs in Brazil owing to its progressive labor laws have
significantly undermined sectoral competitiveness vis-à-vis pro-
ducers in other countries, much more so than SPOPP environmen-
tal requirements. The abundance of large previously deforested
cattle ranches where oil palm can be successfully cultivated at an
economic scale provide ample opportunities for further expansion,
at least for domestic investors. Additionally, although they are sig-
nificantly higher than in most other palm oil producing countries,
environmental costs (e.g. associated with legal reserve opportunity
costs and environmental regularization) tend to be residual sunk
costs that mostly concern the implementation phase. Labor inten-
sive agro-industries in Brazil can generate significant employment
opportunities in areas with few off-farm livelihood options. Yet,
the debilitating effects of high labor costs for oil palm in the coun-12try suggest, in contrast to soy, for example, an inherent competi-
tive disadvantage.
Downgrading labor rights would involve a race to the bottom
and would certainly not be a socially desirable strategy to build a
vibrant palm oil sector. One increasingly acknowledged option by
industry insiders is to address high labor costs by outsourcing
more production to third parties. Especially smallholders that
depend on household labor are less burdened by high labor costs.
With more than 80% of the land under cultivation directly man-
aged by companies, there certainly is significant room to ramp
up external sourcing activities. However, doing so will exacerbate
the aforementioned tensions between the viability of contract
farming and social inclusion. Significant innovation to balance
these trade-offs is however possible, as the previous reflections
illustrate, and could simultaneously help resolve some of the sec-
tor’s structural competitiveness challenges.
Enhancing competitiveness would also involve exploring other
venues besides cost cutting. Sectoral prospects may improve
organically as more biodiesel is expected to be incorporated in
the national energy mix in the coming years, with the mandate
increasing from 10% in 2019 to 20% in 2030. Yet, that will largely
depend on the capacity to compete with soy oil and future invest-
ment in biodiesel plants (Yokoyama, 2017). Reducing dependency
on the domestic biodiesel market, albeit not previously prioritized
under SPOPP, will help in diversifying marketing options, and
reduce the sector’s exposure to developments in the energy sector.
Seeing how the sector is comparatively green compared to the sec-
tor in many other countries and suppliers are largely traceable
(also in contrast to many other countries), palm oil companies in
Brazil are especially well-positioned to gain certification under
RSPO (especially more rigorous versions such as Identity Pre-
served) and demonstrate their CPO is deforestation-free. Invest-
ments in developing an independent traceability system and
more aggressively marketing this internationally could contribute
to opening new market opportunities.7. Conclusions and lessons for governance debates
In this paper, we sought to assess the performance of Brazil’s
palm oil sector, against three government outcome targets, and,
in turn, attribute this to the program (SPOPP) that sought to estab-
lish the rules for sustainable sectoral development. We found that
Brazil has managed to avoid deforestation typically associated with
oil palm expansion. Oil palm establishment involved the conver-
sion of 0.8% and 1.3% of primary forests for corporate and small-
holder plantations, respectively. However, the Brazilian
government did not manage to optimally enhance smallholder par-
ticipation in the sector, as significant differences in performance
were observed between farmers, ranging from very successful
(17%) to highly unsuccessful (12%); and failed to achieve sectoral
development and competitiveness targets. SPOPP’s intentions were
ambitious and commendable, and did contribute to some of the
positive outcomes observed, notably preventing deforestation
and setting the foundation for more smallholder-inclusive sector
development. Though, the program was unable to raise sectoral
competitiveness and scale promising smallholder schemes that
were developed. Some of these failings can be attributed to politi-
cal and economic factors or corporate strategies and decisions
beyond the remit and control of SPOPP. But some arguably could
have been better anticipated and responded to had SPOPP been
more adapted to evolving contexts and investing in developing
governance structures that facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue
and collaborative learning.
As others have done before (Garrett & Rausch, 2016; Van Vliet,
Magliocca, Büchner, Cook, Rey Benayas, Ellis, Heinimann, Keys, Lee,
F. Brandão, G. Schoneveld, P. Pacheco et al. World Development 139 (2021) 105268Liu, Mertz, Meyfroidt, Moritz, Poeplau, Robinson, Seppelt, Seto &
Verburg, 2016), our results highlight the innate tensions between
social, environmental, and economic objectives, as well as the chal-
lenge of reconciling these into one coherent sectoral governance
model. Yet, this case study suggests that domestic governance in
the sector certainly does matter. SPOPP is a valiant attempt to
put in place new - and leverage the existing – domestic structures
to develop a sector in coherence with national rather than transna-
tional priorities, at the same time as alleviating deforestation and
social risks more effectively. Interestingly, the sector was able to
expand rapidly in countries like Malaysia and Indonesia largely be-
cause displacement of forest and indigenous peoples. Also,
exploitation of the labor force was justified in the name of ‘devel-
opment’ (Budidarsono, Susanti, & Zoomers, 2013). Yet, sectoral
competitiveness in Brazil was compromised because it did not jus-
tify sacrificing these in the name of development.
This article by no means tries to make a case for downgrading
socio-environmental safeguards. However, that may risk happen-
ing as right-wing populism makes a resurgence in the country.
Rather, based on findings, we argue that Brazil is well-placed to
leverage sectoral development principles established by SPOPP.
Our analysis points to three under-explored and -exploited oppor-
tunities that can guide palm oil producing countries to build alter-
native governance models. These are: (1) investment in
institutional arrangements that help build adaptive management
capabilities; (2) departing from one-size-fits-all strategies; and
(3) deriving comparative advantage from sustainability.
SPOPPs inability to respond to changing contexts and unantici-
pated performance challenges can partly be attributed to lack of
adaptive management and multi-stakeholder participation. Invest-
ment in institutional structures with monitoring capabilities and
capacity to stimulate dialogue and learning between different
interest groups could enable the type of deliberative and reflexive
governance structures required to continuously balance competing
interests and objectives. That is also important to respond to unin-
tended effects. In other words, institutional innovation can be an
important conduit for regulation innovation (Schut, Cunha
Soares, van de Ven, & Slingerland, 2014).
The rules introduced by SPOPP have enabled development of
smallholder schemes that enlarged smallholder opportunities to
adopt a crop with many pro-poor attributes. Yet, emerging inclu-
sivity concerns suggest that this structure may not serve the inter-
est of especially marginalized and vulnerable groups, as appears to
be characteristic of contract farming more generally (Bellemare,
2012; Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009; Narayanan, 2014). Failure to
adapt the design of these schemes to accommodate the needs
and priorities of excluded groups partly points to a lack of adaptive
management capacity, but also to excessive reliance on a singular
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. As others have pointed out for the
Indonesian palm oil sector (Jelsma, Schoneveld, Zoomers, & van
Westen, 2017; Schoneveld et al., 2019), more explicitly accounting
for smallholder heterogeneity can play an important role in devis-
ing more socially impactful intervention strategies. Alternative
cropping systems or credit facilities for land- and/or labor-
constrained farmers could not only help raise expansion rates,
but also ensure that sectoral growth is broad-based.
Finally, the Brazilian palm oil sector is well positioned to exploit
the rising demand for sustainable CPO especially in Northern coun-
tries. These opportunities have been poorly exploited in the past,
with SPOPP largely conceived to help diversify the national biodie-
sel feedstock supply base. In this regard, the Brazilian palm oil sec-
tor has a comparative advantage over most other producer
countries that can be leveraged more deliberately in future.
Though, this does suggest that being blind to transnational social
processes - as SPOPP (partly purposely) has been - is a risky strat-
egy. Companies such as Agropalma, that in contrast to most others13have aligned their practices with RSPO and corporate zero defor-
estation commitments, are more competitive within international
markets and less dependent on the domestic (energy) market and
governmental protectionism. While the experience from SPOPP
demonstrates the merit of bringing the state back in, in a context
where supply chain relations are increasingly dictated by non-
state regulation, failing to nest domestic governance innovations
in transnational governance innovations risks competitively disad-
vantaging a sector.
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